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Recent years have seen guarantor financing growing rapidly in developing countries, where small firms do not have sufficient creditworthiness to secure bank loans by themselves. However, to date, no paper has studied the efficacy of guarantor financing in a supply chain context. This paper investigates both manufacturer guarantor financing (MGF) and third-party logistics (3PL) guarantor financing (LGF) in a four-party supply chain, featuring a manufacturer, a 3PL, and a retailer, and a bank. Either the manufacturer or 3PL can act as the guarantor of the retailer when it applies credit from the bank. Two different leadership structures are investigated: simultaneous game where the manufacturer and 3PL simultaneously make their decisions and manufacturer leadership Stackelberg game where the manufacturer and 3PL sequentially make their decisions.

Under the simultaneous game, all firms prefer guarantor financing compared to traditional bank financing when the supply chain is cost efficient and expected efficient sales under guarantor financing is attractive . Furthermore, the retailer and the supply chain have no preference between MGF and LGF; while both manufacturer and 3PL prefer the other to be the guarantor.  Under the Stackelberg game, all firms still prefer guarantor financing with conditions. Meanwhile, all firms including 3PL itself prefer 3PL to be the guarantor. Furthermore, our analysis shows that a longer decision hierarchy (i.e., a Stackelberg game rather than a simultaneous game) can be more effective for all firms under guarantor financing with conditions, while under bank financing all firms except the manufacturer prefer the simultaneous game. By further analyzing different cost structures, pricing mechanism and level of initial capital, we find most of the conclusion mentioned above remains true but with more sophisticated conditions.  All these findings enhance our understanding of the value of guarantor financing in a supply chain.

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